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We examine an export game where two firms (home and foreign), located in two different 
countries, produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is the most efficient in 
terms of R&D costs of quality development and the foreign country is relatively larger and 
endowed with a relatively higher income. The unique (risk-dominant) Nash equilibrium 
involves intra-industry trade where the foreign producer manufactures a good of higher 
quality than the domestic firm. This equilibrium is characterized by unilateral dumping by the 
foreign firm into the domestic economy. Two instruments of anti-dumping (AD) policy are 
examined, namely, a price undertaking (PU) and an anti-dumping duty. We show that, when 
firms’ cost asymmetries are low and countries differ substantially in size, a PU leads to a 
quality reversal in the international market, which gives a rationale for the domestic 
government to enact AD law. We also establish an equivalence result between the effects of 
an AD duty and a PU. 
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Times have changed in the world of anti-dumping activities. While only a few developed countries,
mainly the EC and US, were users of anti-dumping action less than a decade ago, anti-dumping is
now used by both developed and developing countries. Recent statistics reveal that 97 members
of the World Trade Organization (counting the EC as a single member) have incorporated anti-
dumping provisions in their national laws (WTO, 2002; Blonigen and Prusa, 2003). Assessing the
current situation, the European Communities conclude: “Anti-dumping is now a ‘global’ instrument
and every country is now both a potential user and a potential target of anti-dumping action’ (EC,
2002a, p.1). International organizations are particularly worried about the increasing human and
ﬁnancial resources that successful anti-dumping investigations require.
The proliferation of countries adopting anti-dumping provisions seem to parallel the accelerating
globalization of the international economy, involving more trade with transition and developing
countries. This is highlighted in the numerous anti-dumping investigations which show considerable
diﬀerences in the types of products made worldwide. Because of lower quality standards in some
countries, their local ﬁrms produce and export goods whose quality is inferior to that of Western
ﬁrms. It is commonly believed that since low quality goods command a lower price, they are prime
candidates for AD petition against their producers.
The various market outcomes of anti-dumping (AD) have been extensively reviewed in Blonigen
and Prusa (2003). Bearing in mind that AD actions by a government sanction ﬁndings of dumping
by exporting ﬁrms into a particular country, a number of stylized facts have inspired our framework
of analysis:
² Of the 1105 measures in force reported in June 2001, 21.8% are maintained by the US and
19.8% by the EC (WTO, 2002, Table IV.6). In terms of cases per dollar of imports, India’s
intensity of AD use is seven times the US ﬁgure, and Argentina’s is twenty times (Finger, Ng
and Wangchuk, 2000). The heterogeneity of countries involved suggests important asymme-
tries between ﬁrms participating in bilateral trade.
² There is convincing evidence that a signiﬁcant proportion of trade is characterized by diﬀerent
levels of quality. For example, Greenaway et al. (1994, 1995) show that over two thirds of all
intra-industry trade in the UK involves trade of vertically diﬀerentiated goods.
² Petitions ﬁled by a US industry against imports concern products which are usually classiﬁed
2under 10 digit subheadings of the Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule of the United States. At this
level of disaggregation, sources of supply of this product in a domestic market are a few
ﬁrms. Even in large trading blocs like the US or EC, it is common that the case concerns
two players, a local and a foreign producer. See, for example, USITC (2001, 2002b), or EC
(2002b, p. 25 and p. 48).
² Hearings and public reports reveal that, besides prices, perceived quality diﬀerences are im-
portant in most AD cases (USITC, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003).
² Anti-dumping protection, via either duties or price undertakings, gives rise to a variety of
strategic interactions between market participants, in particular regarding quality leadership
in the international market.
The importance of these features varies from country to country and no single theory can
describe the complexity of the various cases. However, the main elements that we shall include in
our model are: (i) endogenous quality choice, (ii) asymmetries between ﬁrms and between countries,
(iii) ﬁrms’ strategic responses to AD policies, (iv) intra-industry trade, and (v) quality reversals.
We analyze an international trade game between two ﬁrms located in diﬀerent countries that
produce quality-diﬀerentiated goods. Domestic and foreign consumers have heterogenous prefer-
ences for the sole product attribute, quality. This quality-diﬀerentiated good is supplied at home
and abroad by a local ﬁrm and by imports from the foreign producer. Quality development is costly
and ﬁrms are asymmetric in regard to R&D costs needed for quality development. Both markets
are not totally served in equilibrium, implying endogenous market sizes and are asymmetric in that
they diﬀer in size and in the distribution of consumer tastes. We study a three-stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, governments opt for free trade or enact anti-dumping law. This AD regulation includes
two popular instruments, namely, AD duties and price undertakings. In the second stage, ﬁrms
select the qualities to be produced, and incur the ﬁxed costs; the third stage is an export game
where ﬁrms compete in prices.
We show the existence of a unique (risk-dominant) free trade equilibrium that is characterized
by intra-industry trade. The foreign ﬁrm, which is the most eﬃcient, produces a good of higher
quality than the domestic ﬁrm. Since consumers across countries diﬀer in their concern for quality,
unilateral dumping by the foreign ﬁrm into the domestic market arises in equilibrium. In this
context, there may be a rationale for an AD policy by the domestic government. We ﬁnd that the
eﬀects of a price undertaking hinge upon the extent of asymmetries in countries’ size and wealth as
3well as in ﬁrms’ R&D costs. When countries are of similar size, a price undertaking (PU) cannot be
justiﬁed, neither on the basis of home ﬁrm’s proﬁts nor on the basis of domestic consumer welfare.
When country sizes diﬀer substantially and cost asymmetries are low, a PU leads to a quality
reversal in the international market, which increases not only home ﬁrm’s proﬁts but also domestic
welfare. This provides a rationale for the domestic government to enact anti-dumping law based
on social welfare considerations. If cost asymmetries are large instead, the foreign ﬁrm continue to
produce high quality but exits the domestic economy as a result of a PU. This increases the proﬁts
of the domestic ﬁrm and thus gives a rationale for an AD policy in response to ﬁrm lobbying. We
also examine the eﬀects of AD duties and establish an equivalence result with a PU.
Our paper is a contribution to the study of anti-dumping in oligopolistic industries. The liter-
ature on anti-dumping is extensive and the reader is referred to the survey of Blonigen and Prusa
(2003) and the book of Feenstra (2003) for a detailed discussion of this work. Various papers (see
e.g. Ethier and Fisher, 1987; Fisher, 1992; Leidy and Hoekman, 1990; and Reitzes, 1993) have
examined how the presence of AD protection gives strategic ﬁrms incentives to alter their price
or output decisions vis-´ a-vis free trade to inﬂuence the AD outcome. This may lead to higher or
lower welfare depending on the existing market structure. The distinctive feature of our paper
is that we examine the eﬀects of anti-dumping legislation in an international market where ﬁrms
produce vertically diﬀerentiated products. In this connection, the paper most closely related to our
work is by Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001). In a game of one-way trade between a domestic
and a foreign ﬁrm, they show that, relative to free trade, a PU gives the foreign ﬁrm incentives
to be more aggressive and become the quality leader in the international market. AD law leads
in this case to lower social welfare for the home country. In their paper the competing local price
is used as a proxy for the normal value of a good under a PU, and this blocks the exports of the
foreign low-quality ﬁrm. Our paper diﬀers from theirs, among other things, in that we examine a
model of two-way trade, which allows us to use a more standard deﬁnition of dumping. Anderson
et al.(1995) examine a variant of the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983)
where two governments can enact AD law or not. They ﬁnd that government impose no law in
equilibrium if they maximize welfare. Moreover, though an individual ﬁrm has an incentive to
lobby for AD law, consumer welfare increases and ﬁrm proﬁts fall if laws are bilaterally enacted.
Our paper is also related to the work explaining how product quality matters in international
trade. The monopoly problem is discussed in Musa and Rosen (1978) and Krishna (1987) and
oligopoly versions of this model have recently received substantial attention in the international
4trade literature. The papers most closely related to our work are Mottaet al. (1997), Herguera et
al. (2002) and Zhou et al. (2002). Motta et al. (1997) analyze the introduction of trade between
two countries that produce diﬀerent quality levels. They show that the quality leader maintains its
position after the opening up to international trade. Our paper contributes to this work on quality
leadership by showing that there is a unique equilibrium in the export game and that ﬁrms’ cost
asymmetries are crucial to sustain quality leadership in the market. In addition, our paper focuses
on positive and normative issues of AD policy. Herguera et al. (2002) study optimal trade policy
in a model with one-way trade. Zhou et al. (2002) study the implications of an export policy in
a third-market model where cost diﬀerences between the exporting countries are very large. In
contrast, our model allows for small costs asymmetries as well. This is an important diﬀerence
because it gives the government an incentive to enact AD policy that can lead to a reversal in
quality leadership.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the details of our model. Section 3
solves for the free trade equilibrium and establishes the conditions for dumping. Section 4 examines
AD legislation in the form of price undertakings while Section 5 establishes the equivalence result
between AD duties and price undertakings. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix to ease the reading of the paper.
2 The Model
We examine an international trade game between two ﬁrms producing goods that are vertically
diﬀerentiated. These two ﬁrms, located in two diﬀerent countries, produce goods for their own
market and, eventually, for exports. The ﬁrm located in the foreign (home) country is referred
to as the foreign (home) ﬁrm and all foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk “¤”. We index
both countries by i = 1;2 where subscript 1 refers to the home country and subscript 2 to the
foreign country. Let q¤
i denote the quality of the product manufactured by the foreign ﬁrm to
be sold in country i; i = 1;2: Likewise, let qi be the quality of the product manufactured by the
home ﬁrm to be sold in country i; i = 1;2: As ﬁrms incur ﬁxed R&D costs of quality develop-
ment we assume ﬂexible production (Eaton ad Schmitt, 1994), that is, once ﬁrms invest in the
necessary technology and organize their facilities to develop and produce one basic product, they
can produce various downgrades of this basic product at no cost. The idea is modelled via the
following speciﬁcation of R&D costs: domestic ﬁrm’s costs of producing variants q1 and q2 are





2) = c¤ maxfq¤
1;q¤
2g2=2, where c and c¤ are development cost parameters which measure
R&D eﬃciency. We assume c¤ = 1 without loss of generality and c > 1, that is, the home ﬁrm is
less eﬃcient than the foreign ﬁrm in developing any level of quality.1 Once the quality of the goods
to be oﬀered is determined, we assume that production takes place at a common marginal cost
which is normalized to zero.2
Assume a population of measure 1 at home and a measure m¤ ¸ 1 in the foreign country.
Consumers buy at most one unit and have preferences given by the following quasi-linear (indirect)
utility function: U = µq ¡ p; if she buys a unit of a good of quality q at price p; and 0 otherwise.
Parameter µ is consumer speciﬁc and measures the utility a consumer derives from consuming a
unit of quality. Assume that µ is uniformly distributed over [0;µ] at home, and over [0;¸¤µ] abroad,
with ¸¤ ¸ 1, µ > 0. Tirole (1988) shows that µ is the inverse of the marginal utility of income so
our assumption ¸¤ ¸ 1 implies that foreign consumers have higher incomes on average and more
sophisticated tastes. Our speciﬁcation of demand thus captures both size and income diﬀerences
between countries via m¤ and ¸¤.3 Finally, we assume there are transaction costs associated to
parallel trade which render goods arbitrage unproﬁtable for consumers.
We study a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, governments opt for free trade or
enact anti-dumping law. In the second stage, ﬁrms choose the quality of the goods to be produced,
and incur the ﬁxed costs. Finally, ﬁrms engage in an export game where they compete in prices.
The appropriate solution concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. The model is solved by backward
induction.
3 Trade Equilibrium
The assumptions of our model depict a situation in which a domestic ﬁrm, located in a smaller
and poorer country, considers, besides supplying its own market, to export to a larger and richer
country. It faces competition from a foreign ﬁrm, which is more eﬃcient. Given this, the following
1Cost asymmetries across ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries may capture diﬀerences in the available production tech-
nologies as well as in the costs of labor and capital. They are important here because they allow us to pin down a
unique equilibrium in qualities. The speciﬁcation of the cost function could be more general without aﬀecting results
qualitatively. For example, Moraga-Gonz´ alez and Viaene (2005) use cost functions with a degree of homogeneity
k ¸ 2 in qualities. While larger k values aﬀect results quantitatively, they do not alter them qualitatively.
2This cost speciﬁcation captures the distinctive features of pure vertical diﬀerentiation models, where the costs
of quality improvements mainly fall on ﬁxed costs and involve only a small or no increase in unit variable costs (see
Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983). The normalization adopted here is without loss of generality provided that the main
bulk of costs falls on ﬁxed costs rather than on variable costs. Adding small marginal costs of production makes
computations cumbersome and obscures the presentation of the results.
3As we will see later, country asymmetries in regard to demand may play an equilibrium selection role for some
export strategy proﬁles; moreover they are important for the eﬀects of anti-dumping policy.
6three questions that arise are: Once both countries open up to international trade, what is the
pattern of trade that emerges in equilibrium? What are the product qualities that are produced
by each ﬁrm in equilibrium? For which of the two ﬁrms, if any, is it optimal to dump its good in
the international market? We address these three issues in what follows.
To solve the export game outlined above, it is useful to obtain preliminary results that describe
ﬁrms’ pricing and quality decisions for diﬀerent export strategies. These export strategy proﬁles
lead to the diﬀerent patterns of international trade in Table 1.
Foreign Firm
Home ﬁrm
Export (E) Not export (NE)
Export (E) Intra-industry trade Duo. abroad, mono. at home
Not export (NE) Mono. abroad, duo. at home Autarky
Table 1
This matrix contains four cells, each corresponding to a diﬀerent export strategy proﬁle. The
demands ﬁrms face are diﬀerent across international trade patterns, and so are their optimal quality
and pricing decisions. The games we analyze have typically two Nash equilibria, one where the
foreign ﬁrm is quality leader and one where the domestic ﬁrm is quality leader. To select amongst
equilibria, we use the risk-dominance criterion of Harsany and Selten (1988).4.
3.1 Export Game
Autarky (NE,NE)
The case of autarky is one where each ﬁrm produces only for its own market. In this case,
simple derivations lead to the demands at home and abroad:















Maximization of proﬁts leads to the following result:
Lemma 1 In autarky the domestic ﬁrm produces a good of quality q1 = µ=4c and charges p1 =
µq1=2; while the foreign ﬁrm produces a good of quality q¤
2 = m¤¸¤µ=4 and charges p¤
2 = µ¸¤q¤
2=2:
4This criterion is also used in Motta et al. (1997) and Moraga-Gonz´ alez and Viaene (2005)
7Though both ﬁrms are monopolists in their own country, the foreign ﬁrm always produces the
highest quality because it is more eﬃcient and produces in a larger and richer country where the
average consumer is willing to pay more for each unit of quality.
International duopoly abroad and monopoly at home (E,NE)
This is a situation where the home ﬁrm produces a good of quality q1 for its domestic market
and exports a good of quality q2 to the foreign country; the foreign ﬁrm produces just for its local
market.
Since there is just one good sold in the home country, this country’s demand is given by (1)
as before. By contrast, since two variants are sold in the foreign country, we need to calculate
the demand faced by each ﬁrm. Note that the explicit derivation of each ﬁrm’s demand abroad
depends on whether the foreign ﬁrm’s good is of higher or of lower quality than the domestic variant.
Consider ﬁrst the case where the foreign ﬁrm sells a good of quality q¤
2 in its own market and faces
competition from low-quality exports, i.e., q¤
2 > q2: Denote by e µ the buyer who is indiﬀerent
between buying high quality or low quality. From the buyers’ utility function, it follows that
e µ = (p¤
2 ¡ p2)=(q¤
2 ¡ q2): Denote by b µ the consumer indiﬀerent between acquiring the low-quality
good or nothing, that is, b µ = p2=q2: Hence, the high-quality good is demanded by those consumers
such that e µ · µ · µ: Likewise the low-quality variant is demanded by those buyers such that
b µ · µ < e µ: As µ is uniformly distributed on [0;¸¤µ]; foreign demands for high- and low-quality





















Consider now the opposite case where home ﬁrm’s exports are of higher quality, i.e., q2 > q¤
2:























Using these demands in (3) and in (4) we can solve the game for the diﬀerent quality equilibria
using the Harsany-Selten criterion. As equilibrium proﬁts depend on c and on the product ¸¤m¤;
we ﬁnd that for each product ¸¤m¤ there exists a threshold value of the home ﬁrm’s cost parameter
denoted c(¸¤m¤) such that below c(¢) the domestic ﬁrm is quality leader in the international market
whereas above c(¢) the foreign ﬁrm produces the high-quality good instead.
8Lemma 2 If an equilibrium exists where the home ﬁrm is the only exporter, then q1 = q2; moreover
for every ¸¤m¤ there exists c(¸¤m¤) such that: (i) q1 = q2 > q¤
2 for all c < c(¸¤m¤); (ii) q1 = q2 < q¤
2
for all c > c(¸¤m¤):
This result has two important implications. First, the exporting ﬁrm produces a single product
for the international market. Any other quality proﬁle is ruled out by the cost function that
represents ﬂexible production and the possibility that ﬁrms leapfrog the quality produced by the
competitor. The second implication of Lemma 2 is that when the home ﬁrm is the sole exporter
of goods, though it is less eﬃcient, it becomes quality leader in the international market for low
cost asymmetries. The reason is that the ﬁrm can use larger world revenues to compensate for its
larger development costs. The leadership of the domestic ﬁrm, however, is diﬃcult to sustain when
its relative ineﬃciency increases.
International duopoly at home and monopoly abroad (NE,E)
When the foreign ﬁrm is the sole exporter and the home ﬁrm produces for its domestic market
only, one good is sold in the foreign country and thus the demand for this good is given in (2). In
contrast, two variants are sold in the home country; as before the demand faced by each ﬁrm in the
home country depends on which ﬁrm is the quality leader. Derivations as above can be repeated
for the case where the home ﬁrm sells a good of quality q1 in its own market and faces competition
from exports of a good of lower quality, i.e., q1 > q¤
1:

















In the opposite case where foreign exports are of higher quality, i.e., q¤

















Given these demands the following result oﬀers a necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist.
Lemma 3 If an equilibrium exists where the home ﬁrm produces for its local market only and the
foreign ﬁrm exports goods then q¤
2 = q¤
1 > q1:
As in the preceding trade pattern, there are only two qualities in the international market.
Moreover, when the foreign ﬁrm is the sole exporter it is always the quality leader; this is because
this ﬁrm is more eﬃcient and can spread the development costs over the world market.
Intra-industry trade (E,E)
9When both ﬁrms export, the demands faced by each ﬁrm depend on which of the two ﬁrms is
quality leader. Demands for the diﬀerent cases are given in the expressions (3) to (6). The following
result is a necessary condition for an intra-industry trade equilibrium.
Lemma 4 If an equilibrium exists with intra-industry trade, then q1 = q2 < q¤
1 = q¤
2:
Hence, only two variants can be sold in an equilibrium with intra-industry trade. Moreover,
the quality leader in the international market is the most eﬃcient foreign producer. Summarizing,




Export (E) Not export (NE)
Export (E) q1 = q2 < q¤
1 = q¤
2 q1 = q2 < (>)q¤
2 if c > (<)c(¸¤m¤)
Not export (NE) q1 < q¤
1 = q¤
2 q1 < q¤
2
Table 2
Two important observations follow from Table 2. One, an individual ﬁrm will produce a single
variant for its own market and for the export market. Two, whether a ﬁrm is quality leader in the
international market depends on the parameters of the model, in particular on country size and
income asymmetries and on ﬁrms’ costs asymmetries.
3.2 Equilibrium under Free Trade
Having computed ﬁrms’ equilibrium payoﬀs under diﬀerent export strategy proﬁles, we are now
ready to examine the equilibria of the export game. Denote by ¼i;j (¼¤
i;j) the proﬁts of the domestic





NE;NE, which implies that exporting is a dominant strategy for the foreign ﬁrm. Likewise
exporting is a dominant strategy for the home ﬁrm since ¼E;E > ¼NE;E and ¼E;NE > ¼NE;NE. As
a result the game is dominance solvable and the unique equilibrium involves two-way trade.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the various ﬁrm payoﬀs. The diﬀerence between these two Figures
is the extent of cost asymmetries between the ﬁrms. In Figure 1, the home ﬁrm is not very
ineﬃcient compared to the foreign ﬁrm. This implies that the home ﬁrm is leader in quality for the
export strategy proﬁle fE;NEg (c.f. Lemma 2). Figure 2 is constructed assuming that ﬁrm cost
asymmetries are large; in this case the foreign ﬁrm is quality leader for any export strategy proﬁle.
10Figure 1: Firms’ payoﬀs for low cost asymmetries (¸¤ = m¤ = 1;µ = 100)
Figure 2: Firms’ payoﬀs for large cost asymmetries (¸ = 1;µ = 100)
Let us deﬁne ¹ = q¤=q; with ¹ > 1 since q¤ > q: Variable ¹ represents the quality gap between
the two ﬁrms’ variants and measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Then:
Proposition 1 There is a unique free trade equilibrium of the export game. This equilibrium






(4¹ ¡ 1)3 (7)
that is sold locally and exported to the foreign country; (ii) the foreign ﬁrm produces a good of
higher quality
q¤ = 4µ(1 + ¸¤m¤)
¹(4¹2 ¡ 3¹ + 2)
(4¹ ¡ 1)3 (8)
11for its own market and for exports to the home country; (iii) ¹ is the quality gap between the
variants and is the solution to






























2 = m¤ 2¹
4¹ ¡ 1
(13)


















(vii) Domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁts are ¼ = q¤q=8 and foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts are ¼¤ = 2cq¤q:
In the market equilibrium of Proposition 1, variable ¹ is the unique solution to the third degree
polynomial in (9). Besides being a measure of product diﬀerentiation, ¹ relates to the extent of price
competition between the ﬁrms. To show this, take the ratio (11) to (10) to compute the relative
prices in each market: p¤
1=p1 = 2¹ and p¤
2=p2 = 2¹: An increase in ¹ widens the quality gap, thereby
mitigating competition and increasing relative prices in both countries. For any ¹; demands are
positive so the market equilibrium involves intra-industry trade in vertically diﬀerentiated products,
like in the contributions of Falvey (1981) and Shaked and Sutton (1984). The Grubel-LLoyd index
depends on the primitive parameters of the model: the relative country size m¤; the relative taste
diﬀerence ¸¤; and the relative cost diﬀerence c (via the solution to (9)).
3.3 Conditions for Dumping
A product is considered as being dumped if its export price to a particular country is less than a
“normal value,” standard used by the WTO, or less than a “fair value,” standard used by the U.S.
government. There are diﬀerent ways of calculating a product’s “normal” or “fair” value. The more
standard deﬁnition of dumping, the one that is advanced by the WTO (see the WTO website), is
when a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own
12home market. In our framework, this deﬁnition of dumping leads to a bilateral comparison of p1
with p¤
1; and p2 with p¤
2 in (10) and (11), which yields the following result:5
Proposition 2 Under free trade only unilateral dumping arises; in particular, the foreign ﬁrm
dumps its high-quality goods into the domestic market.
This Proposition leads to a number of observations. First, dumping arises because cross-country
diﬀerences in the distribution of tastes provide the foreign ﬁrm with incentives to cut its export price
relative to the price it charges in its own market. Second, traditional treatments of dumping have
shown the possibility of reciprocal dumping based on transportation costs (Anderson et al. 1995;
Brander and Krugman, 1983; Weinstein, 1992). Here dumping is unilateral and the introduction of
transportation costs or import tariﬀs does not undermine this result, unless they are large enough
to oﬀset the inﬂuence of the cross-country diﬀerences in the distribution of tastes. Third, a popular
belief is that low-quality goods are those that are dumped in the export markets because they
usually command a lower price. In our setting, the reverse occurs: it is the high-quality good that
is dumped into the smaller and poorer country.
To substantiate a case for anti-dumping law the local ﬁrm must also suﬀer injury from dumped
imports. In our framework, the share of imports in the domestic economy is D¤
1=(D1 + D¤
1) = 2=3
(see Proposition 1). It is clear that this market share is suﬃciently large to justify a demand for
AD legislation. Whether the government positively responds to such a demand depends on its
objectives. We use the weighted sum of consumer surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts as a measure of social
welfare:
W = ¯1CS + ¯2¼; ¯j 2 f0;1g;j = 1;2 (15)
When revenues accrue from the imposition of an AD duty, we add them to (15). The weights ¯1
and ¯2 characterize policymaker’s preferences. If ¯1 = ¯2 = 1 we have the usual deﬁnition of social
welfare; if ¯1 = 1 and ¯2 = 0; the government cares only about consumer surplus; ﬁnally when













5Another possibility is to consider the competing local price as a proxy for the normal value. Though this
is characterized as the “lay” deﬁnition of dumping (Weinstein, 1992) and the method has been used in theory
(Vandenbussche and Wauthy, 2001) and applied in a number of cases, among others in Mexico (Niels, 2004), this is
a deﬁnition of last resort, useful only when other methods of calculations are not possible.
6We exclude the case ¯1 = 0 and ¯2 = 0:
13where F(µ) is the cumulative distribution function over the interval [0;µ]: Using equilibrium prices
in (10), consumers surplus can be written more conveniently as:
CS1 =
µ¹2(4¹ + 5)q
2(4¹ ¡ 1)2 : (16)
4 Anti-dumping Policy
Two AD policy instruments are commonly used by governments, namely, price undertakings and
anti-dumping duties. The former is more commonly used in the EU while the latter is observed
more frequently in the US. A price undertaking is a binding commitment to raise export prices
so that either the dumping or the injury suﬀered from dumped imports by the domestic country
is eliminated (GATT, 1991, p. 74). An anti-dumping duty equalizes the price that consumers in
diﬀerent countries pay for the same good by means of an import tariﬀ. The analysis that follows
compares price undertakings and anti-dumping duties and oﬀers an equivalence result between these
two AD instruments. Both are desirable on welfare grounds for certain parameter conﬁgurations. In
particular, they can lead to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the low-quality
ﬁrm becomes the producer of high quality. We begin with the analysis of a price undertaking
because of its simpler derivations.
4.1 Price Undertakings
Under a price undertaking, the foreign ﬁrm must set an export price that is equal to its local price,
i.e., p¤
1 = p¤





































Each ﬁrm takes as given the product qualities and the rival’s prices and chooses its price to
maximize its proﬁts. Taking the ﬁrst order conditions d¼=dp1 = 0 and d¼=dp2 = 0 and rearranging
terms, it is easy to see that it must be the case that p1 = p2 in equilibrium. This implies that a price
undertaking for high-quality products leads to equal local and export prices of low-quality goods
14as well. Given this and using the ﬁrst order condition d¼¤=dp¤ = 0 we can solve for equilibrium
prices:




















(4q¤ ¡ q)2 ¡
cq2
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q¤(4q¤2 ¡ 3q¤q + 2q2)







(4q¤ ¡ q)3 ¡ cq = 0 (18)
To simplify matters, let us again deﬁne ¹ = q¤=q; with ¹ > 1 since q¤ > q: Using ¹; the ratio
of ﬁrst order conditions (17) and (18) leads to an expression exactly identical to (9). Hence, an
important conclusion is that a price undertaking aﬀects neither the equilibrium degree of product
diﬀerentiation ¹ nor the extent of international price competition.









¹(4¹2 ¡ 3¹ + 2)
(4¹ ¡ 1)3 (20)
Since ¹ is unaltered, the qualities in (19) and (20) can easily be compared to those under free trade
in (7) and (8). It is readily seen that a price undertaking leads to a decrease in the quality of both
variants.
















A comparison of these prices with those in Proposition 1 reveals that, compared to free trade,
a price undertaking leads to an increase in all (hedonic) prices in the domestic market and in a
decrease in all (hedonic) prices in the foreign market.































It is clear from (23) and (24) that the world demand for low-quality products faced by the domestic
ﬁrm, (D1 +D2); is not aﬀected by a price undertaking; however, the distribution of quantities sold
in the world changes in such a way that the domestic ﬁrm’s local sales increase and its exports
decrease. Likewise, (D¤
1 + D¤
2) is similar under both free trade and a price undertaking but, in
the latter case, the exports of the foreign ﬁrm decrease while its local sales increase by the same
amount. More importantly, the unique feature of a price undertaking resides in the expression for
D¤
1 in (24): D¤
1 can become zero for certain parameter conﬁgurations, which forces the foreign ﬁrm
out of the export market.
Let us suppose for the moment that a price undertaking does not alter the international trade
pattern, i.e., D¤
1 remains strictly positive. This is the case if the following (suﬃcient) condition
holds.
Condition 1. ¸¤ < 2m¤=(m¤ ¡ 1)
Condition 1 is always satisﬁed whenever countries are of similar size (m¤ = 1). If this condition
holds, we are fully equipped to examine the eﬀects of a price undertaking on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and
consumer surplus. Using ¹; the ﬁrst order conditions (17) and (18), and the expressions for qualities
in (19) and (20), the reduced-form proﬁts of the ﬁrms as follows:





Since we know that qualities are lower under a price undertaking, it is clear that both ﬁrms proﬁts
are lower than under free trade. Hence, when Condition 1 holds, there is no incentive for the
domestic ﬁrm to lobby for an implementation of AD legislation in the form of a PU (¯1 = 0;¯2 = 1
in (15)). Moreover, since a price undertaking does not change ¹ and decreases q; we conclude that
domestic consumers lose from it. The following Proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 3 Assume that Condition 1 holds. Then, compared to free trade, a price undertaking
imposed by the domestic government results in: (i) a decrease in the quality of both variants; (ii) an
16increase (decrease) in the prices of both variants in the domestic (foreign) country; (iii) a decrease
in the proﬁts of both ﬁrms, and (iv) in a decrease in consumer surplus. Anti-dumping policy in the
form of a price undertaking is not justiﬁed in this case.
Suppose now that a price undertaking leads to the exit of the high-quality foreign ﬁrm from
the domestic market. Solving the equation D¤
1 · 0 in ¸¤ and assuming m¤ ¸ 2¹=(2¹ ¡ 1) yields
¸¤ ¸ m¤(4¹ ¡ 1)=(m¤(2¹ ¡ 1) ¡ 2¹): Since the RHS of this expression is monotonically decreasing
in ¹; and since the solution to (9) is monotonically increasing in c; but bounded below by 5:25123
there is a suﬃcient condition for which the foreign ﬁrm refrains from exporting its high-quality
good. This condition is the following:
Condition 2. ¸¤ > 1:91m¤=(0:9m¤ ¡ 1), and m¤ > 1=0:9:
What kind of trade equilibrium does prevail in the presence of a price undertaking when condi-
tion 2 holds? To answer this question we refer to Lemma 2, in particular to cell fE;NEg in Tables
1 and 2. In the proof of this Lemma we show that when the foreign ﬁrm sells only locally while
the domestic ﬁrm sells its good both locally and internationally, if cost asymmetries are suﬃciently
large then the foreign ﬁrm will remain quality leader in the international market. The proﬁts of
the local ﬁrm increase while domestic consumer surplus decreases in this case simply because of
the monopoly position of the home ﬁrm in the domestic market. Implementation of anti-dumping
legislation in this case can only be a response to home ﬁrm lobbying for AD law (¯1 = 0;¯2 = 1 in
(15)).
When cost asymmetries are suﬃciently low, by contrast, a quality reversal takes place: the
domestic ﬁrm becomes the high-quality producer in the unique (risk-dominant) equilibrium of the
export game (see Lemma 2). As high-quality production is highly proﬁtable both domestic ﬁrm’s
proﬁts and consumer surplus increase compared to free trade. In this case, a price undertaking is
desirable whatever the preferences of the government are. Summarizing:
Proposition 4 Assume that Condition 2 holds. Then, for every pair (¸¤;m¤) there exists a
c(¸¤m¤) such that: (i) If c < c(¸¤m¤); relative to free trade, a price undertaking results in a
quality reversal so that the domestic ﬁrm becomes the quality leader in the international market. In
this case, anti-dumping policy increases the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁts and social welfare. As a result,
anti-dumping policy is justiﬁed for any preference of the government. (ii) If c ¸ c(¸¤m¤) a price
undertaking by the domestic government results in an equilibrium where the foreign ﬁrm exits the
17domestic market but holds its quality leadership. In this case, compared to free trade, the domestic
ﬁrm’s proﬁts increase while consumer surplus decreases. As a result, anti-dumping policy in the
form of a price undertaking can only be rationalized on the basis of lobbying by the domestic ﬁrm.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 3. Panel (a) depicts home ﬁrm’s proﬁts; the thicker
curve represents free trade while the broken line a price undertaking. For high cost asymmetries, in
particular for this example c > 1:15, the foreign ﬁrm produces high quality for its local market only,
while the home ﬁrms sells a low-quality good both locally and abroad. For low cost asymmetries
(c < 1:15) a quality reversal takes place and the home ﬁrm produces a good of higher quality than
that of the foreign ﬁrm. When Condition 2 holds, the proﬁts of the local ﬁrm are always greater
under a PU than under free trade. An implication is that these higher proﬁts could potentially
ﬁnance the future adoption of new technologies and of cost-reducing investments. If this is the
case, the quality leadership of the domestic ﬁrm could then be sustained in the long-run.
Panel (b) represents the usual measure of social welfare (¯1 = ¯2 = 1) where the thicker curve
represents welfare under free trade while the broken line under AD intervention. For low cost
asymmetries, welfare is higher under a PU than under free trade. This is the result of the quality
reversal we explained above. High cost asymmetries sustain an equilibrium where the home ﬁrm is
a domestic monopolist and this decreases social welfare relative to free trade.
(a) Home ﬁrm’s proﬁts (b) Domestic welfare
Figure 3: Eﬀects of a price undertaking (¸¤ = 4;m¤ = 3;µ = 100))
184.2 Anti-dumping Duties
The other popular instrument of AD legislation involves the imposition of a duty that equalizes the
price that consumers in diﬀerent countries pay for the same good. Given that the price the foreign
ﬁrm charges locally is p¤
1 and the export price is p¤
2; an anti-dumping policy in the form of a duty
involves a commitment by the domestic government to levy an ad valorem duty t that equalizes
the price that is paid by consumers in diﬀerent countries:
p¤
1(1 + t) = p¤
2 (27)
With an anti-dumping duty t, demands faced by the foreign and domestic ﬁrms are, respectively:
D1(:) =
p¤
















1(:) = 1 ¡
p¤










































The RHS of this ﬁrst order condition is simply the domestic demand for high quality. As long as
D¤
1(¢) is greater than zero, the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm are increasing in its export price p¤
1. The
optimal pricing behavior of the foreign ﬁrm is then to set p¤
1 = p¤
2; which implies that tariﬀ revenues
are zero, as has been shown earlier, for example in Feenstra (2003). In summary we obtain the
following equivalence result.
Proposition 5 An anti-dumping duty imposed by the domestic government results in an equaliza-
tion of international prices. Hence, anti-dumping duties and price undertakings are equivalent in
our model.
195 Conclusions
We have presented a model of international trade where two ﬁrms located in two diﬀerent countries
produce quality-diﬀerentiated goods for their local markets and, eventually, for exports. An impor-
tant feature of our model is the existence of size and income diﬀerences across, and in ﬁrms’ R&D
cost structures. We have shown that, under free trade, the unique (risk-dominant) Nash equilib-
rium involves intra-industry trade; in addition, the most eﬃcient ﬁrm, the foreign, is the quality
leader in the international market. Since consumers in diﬀerent countries diﬀer in their concern for
quality, in equilibrium, unilateral dumping by the foreign ﬁrm into the domestic country occurs.
In this context we have looked for a rationale for AD law.
When countries diﬀer substantially and ﬁrms cost asymmetries are low, then a PU leads to a
quality reversal in the international market. This results not only in much greater proﬁts for the
home ﬁrm but also in greater social welfare, which gives the domestic government incentives to
enact anti-dumping law. By contrast, if ﬁrms’ cost asymmetries are large instead, we have found
that a PU results in the exit of the foreign ﬁrm from the export market, which confers the local
ﬁrm a monopoly position in the domestic market. This provides a rationale for the introduction
of AD policy only based on home ﬁrm lobbying. Finally, we have found no rationale for price
undertakings if countries are of similar size, or if income diﬀerences are small, since they lead to
lower proﬁts for the local ﬁrm and lower social welfare. When AD duties are considered we have
derived an equivalence result between AD duties and PU.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof follows from simple proﬁt-maximization. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Let the home ﬁrm produce goods of quality q1 and q2 and the foreign ﬁrm
a good of quality q¤
2: There are 6 possible quality conﬁgurations. Consider that q¤
2 > q2 > q1: We
note that given optimal pricing of the home ﬁrm p1 = µq1=2; this ﬁrm proﬁts are monotonically
increasing in q1; as a result, the ﬁrm would gain by deviating and increasing q1: The same argument
applies if q2 > q1 > q¤
2 and q2 > q¤
2 > q1: This leaves us with three more cases to consider. Consider
now q1 > q2 > q¤





































We note that the problem of the home ﬁrm is separable in p1 and p2: Taking the ﬁrst order
conditions @¼=@p1 = 0; @¼=@p2 = 0 and @¼¤=@p¤

















Anticipating optimal pricing, it is easy to see now that the proﬁts of the home ﬁrm are monotonically






















2)3 > 0 since q2 > q¤
2:
As a result, the home ﬁrm would gain by deviating and increasing q2:
We now turn to consider q¤
2 > q1 > q2: In this case we note that the foreign ﬁrm would obtain
zero proﬁts and would thus gain by deviating and choosing q¤
2 < q2: To see this note that ﬁrms



































Taking the ﬁrst order conditions @¼=@p1 = 0; @¼=@p2 = 0 and @¼¤=@p¤
2 = 0 and solving the reaction







































21The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to quality @¼=@q1 = 0; @¼=@q2 = 0 and @¼¤=@q¤


























2 ¡ q2)3 ¡ q¤
2 = 0:
From @¼=@q2 = 0; it follows that q2 = 4q¤
2=7: Substituting this into the equation @¼¤=@q¤
2 = 0 and
solving for q¤
2 yields q¤
2 = 7¸¤µ=4and thus q2 = ¸¤µ=6: Substituting q2 and q¤
2 into the expression
for proﬁts yields ¼¤ = 0:
We now prove that the foreign ﬁrm would gain by deviating and producing a good of quality
q¤









































From this equation we can isolate q¤














We are left with the case q1 > q¤
2 > q2: However, it is easy to see that this case is similar to the
previous one. Note that ﬁrms proﬁts would be given by the expression (31) and thus the arguments
above also hold here. This completes the proof that the quality that the home ﬁrm oﬀers abroad
must be equal to the quality it sells domestically, i.e., q1 = q2 = q:
Building in this remark, we note that two quality conﬁgurations can be part of an equilibrium:
(i) q > q¤
2 and (ii) q¤
2 > q: Consider ﬁrst q > q¤




























































































2 = 0: (35)
Unfortunately, these equations cannot be solve analytically for (q;q¤
2) and we are therefore led
to use numerical methods in what follows. Numerical simulations show that the solution to the
system of equations (34)-(35) with accompanying prices given in (33) is indeed an equilibrium for
all parameters: for this we have checked that ﬁrms proﬁts are positive and that a single ﬁrm does
not have incentives to leapfrog the rival’s choice of quality.
We now consider the case q < q¤
2: In this case prices and proﬁts are calculated similarly.
Again the ﬁrst order conditions in quality cannot be solved explicitly and thus we use numerical
analysis. Our simulations show that there exists parameter combinations for which this assignment
in qualities is also an equilibrium. We see that when ¸¤m¤ is large , this is always equilibrium;
otherwise when ¸¤m¤ is small we need the cost of the home ﬁrm to be relatively large. These
observations can be seen in Figure 4, where we have represented the proﬁts ﬁrms obtain for these
two cases. On the horizontal axis we have cost asymmetries; the ﬁrst panel captures a situation of
where consumer preferences are similar across countries while the second panel shows the proﬁts
levels when consumers in the foreign country are willing to pay on average 50% more for one unit
of quality.
Since we have sets of parameters for which the two assignments in qualities can be equilibria,
we are confronted with the question of which equilibrium is more reasonable. Using the Harsany-
Selten risk-dominance notion of reﬁned equilibrium as a selection criterion yields clear-cut results:
for every level of ¸¤m¤; there exists a level of cost c(¸¤m¤) such that for all c < c(¸¤m¤) the
unique reﬁned equilibrium is such that the home ﬁrm produces a good of higher quality than
23(a) ¸ = m = 1 (b) ¸ = 1:5;m = 1
Figure 4: Firms’ proﬁts for diﬀerent quality equilibria)
that of the foreign ﬁrm; otherwise the home ﬁrm is too ineﬃcient and produces low quality. The
criterion is represented in Figure X. If we call the equilibrium where the home ﬁrm produces high
quality “equilibrium 1” and the alternative equilibrium “equilibrium 2”, the left ﬁgure represents
the quantities Gij; which denote the gains to ﬁrm i from predicting correctly that ﬁrm ¡i will select
equilibrium j; i = j;1;2: The right panel shows the criterion: equilibrium 1 is selected whenever
G11G21 > G12G22 and from the graph it follows that the home ﬁrm will produce high quality
provided that cost diﬀerences are not large.
(a) Gij (b) Criterion
Figure 5: Harsany-Selten criterion)
Proof of Lemma 3: The proof goes along the lines of that of Lemma 2 and we skip it to save
on space. The only diﬀerence is that the foreign ﬁrm is always the high quality producer (in the
24Harsany-Selten reﬁned equilibrium). The reason is that the foreign ﬁrm is more eﬃcient than the
home ﬁrm and in addition it serves two markets in this case.
Proof of Lemma 4: We need to rule out any other quality conﬁguration. We note that there
are 4! quality conﬁgurations but the majority of them can be ruled out easily. First, note that
any quality conﬁguration where q1 > q2 > q¤
2 cannot be an equilibrium because the home ﬁrm
would deviate by increasing its quality q2: This rules out 4 possible conﬁgurations. Likewise, any
quality conﬁguration such that q2 > q1 > q¤
1 cannot be equilibrium either since the home ﬁrm
would gain by increasing its quality q1: This rules out 4 quality conﬁgurations more. The same
reasoning can be applied to the foreign ﬁrm. Quality conﬁgurations such that q¤
2 > q¤
1 > q1 can
be ruled out since the foreign ﬁrm would gain by increasing q¤
1:Likewise, cases where q¤
1 > q¤
2 > q2
cannot be part of an equilibrium because the foreign ﬁrm would gain by deviating and increasing
q¤
2: These two arguments together rule out 8 quality conﬁgurations more. Second, suppose that
q¤
2 > q2 > q¤
1 > q1; again, the foreign ﬁrm would gain by increasing its quality q¤
1; which rules out
this case. In the same vein, if q¤
1 > q1 > q¤
2 > q2; the foreign ﬁrm would gain by increasing q¤
2:
Analogously, if q1 > q¤
1 > q2 > q¤
2; then the home ﬁrm would deviate by increasing q2: The home
ﬁrm would also deviate if q2 > q¤
2 > q1 > q¤
1; in this case by increasing q1: So we are left with only
four possible quality conﬁgurations which can be part of an equilibrium. We turn to examine these
conﬁgurations. Consider ﬁrst the case where q1 > q¤
2 > q¤
1 > q2: We note that the home ﬁrm is a
quality leader in the domestic market but sells a low quality good in the foreign market. Using the





























The home ﬁrm chooses (q1;q2) to maximize ¼ and the foreign ﬁrm selects (q¤
1;q¤
2) to maximize ¼¤:
We note that the ﬁrms problem are separable in qualities. Taking the ﬁrst order conditions and

























25We now check that the home ﬁrm would gain by deviating and producing a higher quality abroad,
























(24cq1 ¡ µ)3 +
720c2q1µ
2










1 ¡ 252¸¤m¤µq1 + 49¸¤2m¤µ
2
(96q1 ¡ 7¸¤m¤µ)3
Unfortunately, there is no analytical solution for this equation. We have proceeded numerically
and checked that the deviating ﬁrm always obtains higher proﬁts than equilibrium proﬁts. We note
that the remaining assignment in qualities have the same properties, that is, a ﬁrm is leader in
quality in a market but is a low quality seller in the other market (the other ﬁrm vice-versa) and
therefore similar arguments rule out these cases.
It remains to check that the Harsany-Selten criterion selects always the foreign ﬁrm as a high
quality producer. The proof is also based on numerical simulations and is similar to the proof of
Lemma 1; we skip it to save on space. ¥
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